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From 1982 until 2016, multiple waves of corporate inversions resulted in many US-based companies 
shifting their legal headquarters to countries offering tax advantages, i.e. redomiciling. A corporate 
inversion occurs when a US corporation that is the ultimate owner of its worldwide operations takes 
steps to become a wholly-owned subsidiary of a foreign corporation. Generally, the primary 
motivation for inversion is to minimize global tax obligations and access overseas profits without 
incurring additional taxes.1 Corporate inversions are a form of FDI in the United States.  
 
The inversion phenomenon largely ended after the US Department of the Treasury changed the 
regulations governing these transactions in 2016.2 Analysts have speculated that the passage of the 
2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) would lead many inverted companies to take advantage of the 
decrease in the US corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% and the general elimination of the tax on 
repatriated foreign earnings, and become US-owned companies again. However, according to 
preliminary Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) US FDI statistics, there was not a widespread 
reversal of corporate inversions in the year following passage of the TCJA, though companies may 
choose to do so in the future.  
 
Corporate inversions first gained public and legislative attention in the 1990s because of the erosion 
of the US tax base, the cost advantages to foreign-controlled firms and the movement of assets and 
economic activity outside of the US.3 The first wave of inversions involved reincorporation abroad 
with minimal change in corporations’ physical operations, shareholders or business decisions. The 
2004 American Jobs Creation Act included provisions to curtail inversions, but did not stop them 
completely. The second wave of corporate inversions met the new legal requirements by merging 
domestic firms with existing foreign companies. Additional Treasury regulations in 2014 and 2016 
sought to end inversions altogether. Evidence suggests that these regulations were instrumental in 
decreasing inversions in subsequent years.   
 
BEA publishes FDI statistics based on data it collects on mandatory surveys of foreign-owned US 
companies. These statistics include transactions resulting from corporate inversions. However, the 
surveys do not collect information on whether a US corporation became foreign-owned as a result of 
a corporate inversion. Consequently, these transactions cannot be separately identified in the statistics 
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based only on the survey data. Using publicly available information, such as commercial databases 
and media reports, BEA estimates that inversions led to substantial FDI equity inflows into the US in 
2015, which then dropped off after the Treasury regulation changed in 2016.4 In 2015, net equity 
inflows into the US were US$340.9 billion, compared with US$51.6 billion in 2014. BEA estimates 
that approximately one-third of the increase was due to corporate inversions.  
 
While the TCJA further reduced the advantages of inversions, some provisions, such as limitations 
on earnings stripping and the loss of some tax deductions on intercompany loans, may limit the US 
appeal as a base of operations for MNEs. Furthermore, regulations for some TCJA provisions are still 
being finalized, and parts of the law are being challenged in the WTO.5 CEO statements and 
shareholder reports indicate that some firms considering a reversal of prior corporate inversions are 
waiting for the resolution of some of these uncertainties.6 Equity decreases—transactions that result 
in a decrease in foreign ownership of US companies—were larger in 2018 than in 2017 according to 
BEA’s FDI statistics. However, the larger equity decreases in 2018 do not suggest widespread 
redomiciling by inverted companies but rather firm-specific factors.   
 
It may be too early to tell the TCJA’s ultimate effect on corporate inversions in the US as firms are 
still adjusting to the new US tax system.7 Additionally, lower US tax rates could spur other countries 
to adjust their rates or implement other measures to encourage FDI. Finally, unwinding direct 
investments tends to be a much more difficult and costly exercise than unwinding portfolio 
investments. While firms are still adapting to the new law, BEA’s statistics suggest that, so far, the 
TCJA has not led to significant redomiciling of inverted companies. If it ultimately results in 
widespread redomiciling, this model of using tax incentives to encourage inverted companies to 
become U.S.-owned again will appear to have achieved one of its policy objectives.8 
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